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Professor Adelman's authoritative treatise on the world petroleum
market has been over a decade in preparation, though he has
published enough other writings on the subject during that time to
give the community of oil-watchers a good preview of his position on
various questions. The book lives up to expectations in every respect.
It combines a thorough survey of the recent history and factual data of
the world oil industry with a penetrating economic analysis. Its expert
orchestration of fact and theory indeed sets a model for future writers
on the economics of industrial organization.
Adelman's approach to the economics of the world petroleum
market, brilliantly developed in this work, has provided a persuasive
explanation of the long decline of world prices from 1957 (and even
before that) to 1970. His opinions have strongly influenced the views
held by most students of the industry concerning its essential structure
and dynamics-including the views embodied in the Report of the
Cabinet Task Force on Oil Import Controls (The Oil Import Question,
1970). That approach was, in essence, that supply was bound to
expand rapidly because the long-run marginal cost in the Middle East
was far below the world price; that prices would continue to decline
toward (though perhaps not nearly to) this marginal cost; and that the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was a failed
cartel which was bound to be ineffectual under the circumstances.
Events seem to have overtaken that position. In a very short time,
in 1970-71, the situation in the world industry changed abruptly, and
a new configuration emerged to which Adelman's earlier views did
not seem to apply without modification. Prices suddenly began to
climb; surplus changed to scarcity; OPEC grew powerful overnight
and began to increase both taxes and prices around the world; several
producing countries did other disagreeable things such as expropriating properties, demanding a share of ownership in producing their
resources, and fixing output rates. What happened? Had the underlying economic forces in the world petroleum market changed so
fundamentally as to require an entirely new explanation and forecast?
Professor Adelman does not seem to think so, though he recognizes
the dramatic effects of the events of 1970-71. What happened was
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that the producers' cartel seized upon the consequences of some
events of that period-e.g. the Libyan cutback and the temporary
interruption of the Trans-Arabian pipeline, which raised transportation costs and prices in consuming countries quite drastically. A tacit
combination of producing countries and international oil companies
perpetuated the conditions of that period, up to now, by collusive
control which the consuming countries failed to counteract for a
variety of reasons. "The producing nations now have a cartel
tolerated by the consuming countries and actively supported by the
United States. But there is as yet no effective limit on output, nor
division of the market, and hence no change in the long-term
outlook." (p. 250). The United States Government has supported
OPEC with the hope of securing stability in the world oil economy,
for the Western Alliance,-a hope that has repeatedly been dashed.
(pp. 254-256).
Other observers do not find this explanation entirely persuasive. It
is not easy to understand how the cartel could maintain itself so
effectively now in the face of the same disruptive forces that nullified
it in the 1960's, while purely psychological explanations or attribution
of the key role to the maladroitness and mistakes of the U.S.
Department of State seem too weak to account for what has
happened.
More to the point is the question of what will happen in the future.
If Adelman's critics are right, the demand on world markets will
increase faster than the rate of development of new supply in the next
few years, OPEC will continue to gain strength, prices will continue
to rise and the revenues of exporting countries will grow exponentially. These things will happen regardless of the role played by the major
international oil companies. Professor Adelman, on the other hand,
thinks that the underlying economic forces will produce a resumption
of the downward march of prices; all that is necessary is for the U.S.
and other consuming nations to ". . . remove the multinational oil
companies as the OPEC nations' tax collection agents." (p. 261).
When the exporting countries, or their national companies, become
the sellers on the world markets, competition will break out again and
prices will again decline-especially if the consuming countries take
advantage of their buying power. "There would no longer be a floor of
tax-plus-cost, but only one of cost" (p. 261), and costs are very much
less than prices.
It will be a matter of acute interest to all readers of this volume to
see whether Professor Adelman's conditional forecast is borne out by
actual events, which have continued to unfold rapidly since the book
was published. Several exporting countries have demanded and
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secured "participation" in the ownership of their producing industries, leading ultimately to majority control; at least one (Iran) has
begun to move into partnership with an international oil company in
its refining and marketing operations. Control at home and forward
integration abroad by the natioanl companies of countries which will
play the dominant role on world markets in the future can obviously
have profound consequences for the international petroleum economy. Observers of that process, whether they agree with Professor
Adelman's basic views or not, would do well to read this treatise with
careful attention.
JAMES W. McKIE*
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